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"FAMILY VALUES" AND FAMILY LAW REFORM
Harry D. Krause*
Have you wondered lately about "family values"?' Will all be well again
when Murphy Brown is replaced by Father Knows Best?2 Or did it seem to
you that the recent debate had all the unreality of a vice-presidential candi-
date squaring off with a TV character? (That was a vice-president for the
United States, not CBS.)
Unreality? Remember, this was the year a non-viable, on-again candidate
defined the post-Vietnam issues in the election campaign3 and nearly had his
daughter's wedding ruined;4 Penthouse "exposed" Gennifer Flowers in full
bloom to save the nation from sleaze;' abortion and sexual harassment en-
dangered the Supreme Court; Woody Allen double-crossed the line between
his reality and his fiction;6 and Princesses Di and Fergie risked ousting the
royal family.7
The past campaign's low-blow debate on family values accomplished
nothing.8 The sad thing is that the ratings war between Murphy Brown and
Father Knows Best has nothing to do with today's family issues. Life is not
as simple as switching to another channel or even to another candidate.
Deplorably, the pro-family message has gotten mixed up with the anti-
tolerance message and seems to have turned the pro-tolerance message into
* Copyright 1992. Not to be quoted without author's specific permission.
1. William Safire, Family Values, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 6, 1992, § 6 (Magazine) at 14.
2. Kevin Sack, Quayle Tries to Separate Family Values and "Murphy Brown," N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1992, at A20.
3. H. Ross PEROT, UNITED WE STAND (1992).
4. Eric Pianin & John Mintz, Dirty Tricks Charged by Perot, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1992,
at Al; Steven A. Holmes, Texan Says He'll Let It Drop-But Doesn't, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 27,
1992, at Al, A18.
5. Bob Guccione, the publisher of Penthouse, "said he 'decided to go ahead with it' out
of fear of what would happen if her new allegations fell into the hands of media hostile to Bill
Clinton's candidacy, which would neither treat them responsibly nor allow Governor Clinton
an opportunity to respond .... Ralph Z. Hallow, Flowers Bares All, Tells All, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1992, at Al, A8.
6. Mona Charen, Woody A Product of His Times, CHAMPAIGN-URBANA NEWS GA-
ZETTE, Aug. 27, 1992, at A4.
7. Company Brief- House of Windsor, ECONOMIST, Aug. 29, 1992, at 53.
8. Transcript of First TV Debate Among Bush, Clinton and Perot, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1992, at A14, A16; Clinton, Bush Spar on Family Values; Perot Ridicules Flap, CHAMPAIGN-
URBANA NEWS GAZETTE, May 22, 1992, at Cl.
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an anti-family message. But there really is a "family values" problem.
David Hamburg writes:
[Flor the atrocities now being committed on our children .... we
are all paying a great deal.... [I]n economic inefficiency, loss of
productivity, lack of skill, high health care costs, growing prison
costs, and a badly ripped social fabric.9
Mary Ann Glendon adds:
Neither historical nor comparative investigation has unearthed ex-
amples of institutions that can take the place of families, neighbor-
hoods, and workplace and religious associations as places where
these [pluralistic] skills and virtues can be generated, shaped, trans-
formed, and transmitted from one generation to the next.10
Hamburg's and Glendon's focus on children mirrors my own definition of
the meaning of "family values:" They concern the raising of children. I
don't much care what consenting adults do for or to each other.
When and how did the trouble with the family start? If it were possible to
pick one point in time in a continuous process, I'd pick the 1960s.
The 1960s were revolutionary. One defining philosophical factor was that
the long-held ideal of equality came into closer focus. What does that have
to do with the family? Listen to John Rawls:
The consistent application of the principle of fair opportunity re-
quires us to view persons independently from the influences of
their social position. But how far should this tendency be carried?
It seems that even when fair opportunity (as it has been defined) is
satisfied, the family will lead to unequal chances between individu-
als. Is the family to be abolished then? Taken by itself and given a
certain primacy, the idea of equal opportunity inclines in this
direction. "
But it seems unlikely that the breakdown of the traditional family pro-
ceeded only from such lofty thoughts. The other philosophical factor that
defined the 1960s was the assertion of a new, selfish individualism against the
so-called "establishment," against traditional structures and strictures. The
resulting gains or losses - depending on the eye of the beholder - were
consolidated in the 1970s. From no-fault tort liability, to no-fault divorce, to
no-fault sin. The 1977 bestseller Looking Out For Number One12 defined the
9. David Hamburg, Family Crucible and Healthy Child Development in CARNEGIE COR-
PORATION OF NEW YORK, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1991).
10. Mary Ann Glendon, Preliminary Draft of the General Report: Individualism and
Communitarianism in Contemporary Legal Systems 52 (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
11. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 511 (1971) (footnote omitted).
12. ROBERT J. RINGER, LOOKING OUT FOR NUMBER ONE (1977).
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1980s. Where do we go from here?
I'll answer the old jurisprudential question of whether life follows law or
law follows life, by compromising: Ideally, there should be some of both.
To be effective, law cannot be removed too far from life, but sound law also
can and should help channel life in terms of broader social needs. I do not
think that we have fully understood the depth of the change around us. In
one area, we have adapted the rules of the game too much and too soon and
thereby accelerated social phenomena with which we might have been better
advised to keep pace or, indeed, to differ. In other areas, we may have
moved too cautiously.
By and large, I think that family law reform has failed because it has
failed to respond effectively to continuing social needs. By and large, I think
that many of the family law adaptations of the last thirty years have in-
creased the cost and risk of marriage and responsible parenthood, reduced
their advantage and not so subtly rewarded the opposite.
What has been lacking completely is effective integration of family law
reform with the incentives and disincentives in our social welfare and the
taxation systems. There may be an explanation, though no excuse, for that:
In our federal system, family law is a state concern whereas welfare and
taxation are primarily in the hands of the federal government. There has not
been enough, if any, communication. I'll get back to that in my conclusion.
First, I'll try to evaluate the effect on "family values" of reform in three core
areas: Divorce, Unmarried Cohabitation and Child Support.
I. DIVORCE
One divorce reform debate is over. Marital status is no longer seriously at
issue. Divorce is available at the will of either the wife or the husband-
regardless of fault or merit, or who did what, for or to whom. No-fault
reigns even in those states that have retained fault grounds on their books as
an option to no-fault divorce.
When status was the issue in divorce, the state presumed to reserve for
itself the power to grant or deny divorce, depending on a historical (reli-
gious) definition of marital (moral) fault. In effect, that law prescribed that
only an "innocent" spouse could divorce only a "guilty" spouse. Con-
versely, this meant that an "innocent" spouse could not be divorced against
her or his will. "Guilt" and "innocence" were defined by the legal grounds
for divorce. If one played by the rules, marriage provided economic stability
and social security.
The reformers of the 1850s had complained that disaffected parties should
be allowed to divorce for fault. The reformers of the 1960s proclaimed that
1993]
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the traditional catalogue of marital fault grounds was too narrow and out of
touch with the realities of modem marriage. But they still focused on status.
It seemingly escaped their notice that de facto no-fault divorce had been
practiced for centuries, and for decades ever more blatantly. Indeed, just
before divorce reform finally swept the secular world in the 1960s and 1970s,
upward of 90% of all divorces were "consensual."
In practical reality then, in contradiction to the law on the books, status
had not been the important issue in divorce for some time. What the old law
really meant was not that divorce was difficult. It meant that if one party
wanted a divorce but had no "licensed" grounds, he had to negotiate and
pay her price. Underhandedly, the grounds that ostensibly governed the is-
sue of status, thus governed the financial consequences of divorce. The ne-
gotiation over status hid the real issue: Economic consequences. Divorce
went at the price for which the "willing seller" would sell the marriage.
That price was equal to what the "willing buyer" would pay for the divorce.
Supply and demand were in equilibrium, "economics" worked. But where
Judge Posner and the new Chicago Nobelist, Gary Becker, might praise the
free market, others saw a sort of jungle law.
Where the professed aim of no-fault divorce reform was to bring humane
sense to a corrupt process, the significant change it actually brought was
divorce at the will of either party. At the margin, the move was from con-
sensual divorce to unilateral divorce. What was hailed as reform reduced
the role of contractual fidelity, -and depreciated reasonable, economic reli-
ance interests in the most confidential legal relationship. Marriage became
the only contract out of which a breaching party may walk with impunity
and, likely as not, profit. Perplexingly, this came to us at the very time when
other areas of our law moved from caveat emptor to an extraordinary, un-
precedented concern for the economic underdog.
Since the State no longer asks whether the dissonant parties should be
granted or denied their divorce, financial arrangements now have openly
taken center stage. Today's contested questions include the allocation of ali-
mony, the distribution of property, and decisions on child support. But
given the complexities of the task, the financial consequences of divorce have
not been resolved as fully or as easily as was the status issue.
Who should get how much, of what, from whom, and why? The answer
remains elusive and the task undone, although many laws have been passed.
Twenty years too late, we are now struggling with it in the American Law
Institute's new project on the consequences of "family dissolution" 13-"di-
13. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1991) (preliminary draft no. 2).
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vorce" in "old-speak."
Again, you are asked to believe that "marital fault" is irrelevant. The
perception that inquiry into marital fault is futile and unpleasant had gov-
erned the early divorce reform debate. Remember, there the question was
whether marital fault should govern the status decision, then the State pre-
sumed to reserve to itself the decision whether parties should be allowed to
divorce at all. But once it had been resolved that "fault" should not answer
the question whether to allow divorce, the reformers carelessly transferred
their aversion to fault to the very different question of what the financial
consequences of the termination of marriage should be.
Are the risks of marriage increased and is marriage diminished as a legal
status, as an economic good, if "good" or "bad" behavior does not matter?
Is it not intuitive-at least to anyone who is not a lawyer-that "fault" and
"merit" are relevant to achieving "fairness?" They are relevant in all other
areas of the law, so why not to the fair distribution of the financial burdens
(and benefits) of divorce? The true question is what is fair, and how should
we judge. I do not think that the standard, preferred answer "we can't tell,
we don't want to know, and there's no such thing as a nice husband or a nice
wife anyway" is wholly satisfactory.
This idea is not picked out of the air. In several states, an extreme return
to marital fault through a side door-or rather through a dark basement-is
now creating havoc with no-fault divorce.1" Tort law has become the vehi-
cle, alongside or after a divorce action, to compensate one spouse financially
for "emotional distress" inflicted during the marriage by the other spouse.
Let me brief one case.
In 1988, a jury in Houston awarded a divorcing wife $1.4 million, for
"severe emotional distress" caused by her husband's marital misconduct.'"
Not the National Enquirer, but the Wall Street Journal reported that "on a
visit to her husband's office in 1986, she found him sprawled nude with a
former company secretary."'
16
I am not interested in defending family lawyer's turf. But I worry, along
with the Vice-President, when those "sharp tort lawyers" in their "tasseled
loafers"17 gloat:
Marital tort litigation took off and shows no signs of regressing.
Nationwide, marital tort recoveries are high.... When considering
14. Rorie Sherman, When Divorce Is Not Enough, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 23, 1991, at 1.
15. Chiles v. Chiles, 779 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
16. Carolyn Phillips, Divorce Case Marks First Time a Spouse Wins Civil Award for Emo-
tional Distress, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1988, at 39.
17. Alessandra Stanley, Selling Voters on Bush, Nemesis of Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
31, 1992, at Al.
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the more common torts - such as intentional or negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, assault, defamation, false imprisonment,
and interference with child custody - counsel must give careful
thought to asserting as an element of damages post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD). This is a mental health disorder precipi-
tated by a psychologically traumatic experience outside the range
of usual human experience, such as serious physical or emotional
injury.... Counsel must know how to make the client's distress
come alive to the trier of fact. [And here is the tort lawyers'
conclusion:]
State no-fault statutes often do not do enough to redress wrongs.
With no-fault, one spouse may abuse the other without legal conse-
quence - even though the conduct would be deemed tortious if
committed by a non-spouse. 8
Well, I think that it is the very essence of marriage that it is not a relation-
ship between strangers. But I agree that the idea of right and wrong is one
whose time has never gone. Its return to the financial aftermath of marriage
through tort law, however, can only reintroduce to the divorce process more
and worse acrimony than no-fault divorce ever eliminated.
By all means, let us stay away from the traditional mechanical application
of the old fault grounds for divorce, from adultery to desertion. But a new
concept of "fault" can and should be factored into the decision how to ap-
portion the financial burdens or benefits of divorce. Call it "blame" and
"merit" if you prefer. Or think in terms of "unjust enrichment" or "quan-
tum meruit."
Is there a way to deal responsibly with those cases of marital misconduct
that overstep the bounds of the marital relationship? A few years ago Ger-
many abandoned the pure "no fault" approach and reintroduced a modified
and limited catalogue of "blame-and-merit" considerations to the apportion-
ment of financial consequences on divorce, as follows:
A claim for support must be denied, reduced or limited in dura-
tion, if the imposition of the obligation.., would be grossly inequi-
table because... (2) The recipient is guilty of a crime or of a severe
intentional offense against the obligor or against a near relative of
the obligor; (3) The recipient has caused his or her own need inten-
tionally or recklessly; (4) The recipient has intentionally or reck-
lessly disregarded significant financial interests of the obligor; (5)
For a considerable period of time before the separation, the recipi-
ent has grossly violated his or her duty to contribute to the support
of the family; (6) The recipient is responsible for obviously serious,
18. Roxanne Barton Conlin, A Safer, Saner, Fairer Nation, TRIAL, Oct. 1992, at 7.
Family Values
clearly unilateral misconduct against the obligor;... !19
Is that ridiculous? No. Can it be improved upon? Probably. Perhaps it
is not fair that this provision-as did our abolished marital fault law-paves
only a one-way street: Fault is used only to allow the escape from, or reduc-
tion of, an obligation; perhaps fault should also weigh in by increasing the
load? That of course is the answer tort law provides, and it may not be all
wrong. I am sure that playing with tort law is the worst-case alternative,2 °
and whatever may be the appropriate answer, however, it should be devel-
oped in the context of divorce law.
Another reform trend that has increased the risk of marriage is the trend
toward decreased provision for a spouse on divorce-even where that depen-
dency was created by marriage and, particularly, marital role division.
Nearly accomplished legal equality of women and men and related social
change have accelerated emotion-charged attack on the alimony front 21-
even while eligibility for alimony has been extended to men.22 "Men's lib-
bers" proclaim that they should not be forced to support "alimony drones."
They add that women should no longer view marriage as "a bread ticket for
life." Feminists consider alimony demeaning, as it spells continued financial
dependence on a possibly despised ex-spouse. Adding insult to injury, ali-
mony may subject the recipient to nasty conditions, involving her post-mari-
tal sexual behavior. As you probably know, traditional alimony ended on
the ex-wife's remarriage and now, in some cases, when she "cohabits"-
whatever that may mean.23
To escape the acrimony of alimony, and to achieve finality in the divorce,
the emphasis now is on property division. Actually, there has long been full
equality between husband and wife in matters of property: Each owned un-
til and kept after divorce, all property that he or she had earned during the
marriage. The only problem with that equality was that typically only one
of them had earnings. Guess who! Commendably, the treatment of prop-
erty 3n divorce has undergone fundamental change, favoring the economi-
cally weaker spouse, typically the wife.
All too often, however, the overarching goal of modern divorce, finality,
collides with the reality that there is no significant amount of property. The
19. Civil Code (BGB) § 1579 (F.R.G.).
20. A somewhat less categorical answer may be called for in the case of physical injury, as
distinguished from the psychological/intangible harm in my example above.
21. E.g. Kennedy v. Kennedy, 303 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1974); In Re Marriage of
Brantner, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
22. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
23. E.g., In Re Sappington, 478 N.E. 2d 376, 378 (Ill. 1985) ( interpreting ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 510 (b)). Cf. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 248 (McKinney 1986); CAL. CIV.
CODE § 4801.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1983).
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compromise between the need for provision and the goal of finality is that,
when post-divorce maintenance is provided, today's theme is "rehabilita-
tion." From what? From nothing more or less than motherhood, formerly
revered as much as apple pie. Rehabilitation to what? To self-support, but
all too often without adequate concern for the dependent spouse's lack of
adequate economic opportunity. The very word "rehabilitation" suggests
pathology. It implies that the marital role-division that makes full-time
parenthood possible is now considered pathological.
This sounds harsh, but we may actually be on the right track. The tradi-
tion of full-time motherhood, as an exclusive track for women, really was not
a fair societal response to the joint parental responsibility of child rearing.
(Indeed, neither was the role of sole financial supporter that was thrust upon
the man).
Marriage and procreation have only recently been "certified" by the
United States Supreme Court as fundamental human rights.24 But one may
fairly conclude that our present legal/economic/social circumstances have
rendered these rights less meaningful by making their exercise too costly.
The legal and economic incentive structure may already be so loaded against
the role-divided family that an intelligent woman or man no longer has a
reasonable choice to forgo market participation in favor of family role
division.
Which alternative do you prefer: Should a reformed incentive structure
provide parents (fathers or mothers) a "more equal" choice between partici-
pation in the market place and dedicating themselves to their family? Or
should we define a fair compromise between career and child rearing for men
and women?
II. UNMARRIED COHABITATION
After what I have said of the dangers of marriage followed by divorce, it is
no surprise that marriage is on the rocks. To the middle class, "role divi-
sion" now poses risks that many reasonable women and men consider unac-
ceptable. Traditional marriage may sound bad for the economically weaker
spouse, but the cost of post-divorce economic provision for children and ex-
spouse may also bring the "earner-spouse" to the financial breaking point.
Not coincidentally, new attitudes toward sexual companionship, marriage,
and family formation have become socially and legally acceptable. Many
modern couples think that the commitments and burdens of marriage out-
weigh its advantages.
24. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). Cf Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 485 (1965).
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It is one very practical attraction of unmarried cohabitation that no poten-
tially costly procedures are needed to end the relationship. Even better, the
financial consequences of divorce - though not child support - are
avoided. For two-earner couples who are conscious of tax law and social
welfare benefits, cohabitation may bring financial advantages over marriage.
For the feminist, cohabitation promises freedom from traditional male domi-
nance that is perpetuated in antiquated marriage and family laws. For the
"unemancipated" recipient of welfare benefits, or of alimony derived from a
first marriage, remarriage or marriage may be costly if, as is often the case,
these payments are thereby terminated.
Traditionalists fear that formal marriage is depreciated if legal incidents
similar to those of marriage are bestowed on unmarried cohabitation.
Pragmatists are concerned about the legal uncertainties that are created if,
typically retrospectively, informal relationships are judicially held to be en-
dowed with legal rights and obligations that, at best, were thoroughly un-
clear during the ongoing relationship. Historians see a replay of
developments that, in 1753 in England, led to the abrogation of common law
marriage. Cynics remember the old-time semi-legal status of the "concu-
bine." Least pleasantly, Marvin v. Marvin' has emerged as a legalized
blackmail weapon for disappointed lovers, akin to, but more troublesome
than even the old-fashioned "heartbalm" actions. To underscore this last
point, numerous prominent figures, including Billie Jean King, Liberace,
Ringo Starr, Daryl Zanuck, Alice Cooper, Peter Frampton, and the Bloom-
ingdale estate have been sued and several have made expensive settlements-
less perhaps because the paramour could not have been defeated, and more,
probably, to avoid embarrassing publicity.
For the really sophisticated couple, unmarried cohabitation seems to af-
ford an opportunity to define the terms of their relationship individually and
precisely. This opportunity was largely denied them by traditional marriage
law, which overrode attempts at contractual variation of essential rights and
duties the law deemed inherent in marriage. Ironically-in a "Gresham's
Law" response-the widely adopted "Uniform Premarital Agreements
Act ' 26 and similar laws now allow the partners to define and downgrade the
legal consequences of their marital relationship "i la carte." Marriage is
declining not only in numbers but in legal content. Deregulation is the
word.
Ironically, many of the same "progressives" who enthusiastically applaud
the "deregulation" of the formal family now call for the regulation of the
25. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
26. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT, 9B U.L.A. 371 (1987).
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informal family. Non-marital cohabitation is practiced so widely that legal
consequences-a sort of forced marriage, second class-are being proposed.
Is it "progress" to regulate free love? Is it "reactionary" to express concern
about the resultant decrease in freedom of choice of sexual lifestyle?
In several celebrated cases, legal consequences have been ordained by im-
portant courts, in others denied. Two leading cases illustrate the range of
opinion. In Marvin v. Marvin,27 Lee while still married to Betty, had an
affair with Michelle who became his companion for almost six years. Lee
stopped paying one year and a half after he had "compelled" Michelle to
"leave his household." Michelle sued. The Supreme Court of California lip-
served the traditional view: "The courts should enforce express contracts
between nonmarital partners except to the extent that the contract is explic-
itly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services."28 But
from there, the court proceeded "on the principle that adults who volunta-
rily live together and engage in sexual relations are nonetheless as competent
as any other persons to contract respecting their earnings and property
rights."29 Indeed, absent an express contract,
[T]he courts may inquire into the conduct of the parties to deter-
mine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied contract or
implied agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other
tacit understanding between the parties. The courts may, when ap-
propriate, employ principles of constructive trust or resulting trust.
Finally, a nonmarital partner may recover in quantum meruit for
the reasonable value of household services rendered less the rea-
sonable value of support received if he can show that he rendered
services with the expectation of monetary reward.3°
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Hewitt v. Hewitt 3' is the antithe-
sis of Marvin. A dentist had held out Victoria as his wife for fifteen years.
She had borne and raised their three children. When Victoria sought a di-
vorce, her dentist (whom she believed to be her husband) confronted her
with the information that they had never been legally married. And in fact,
their cohabitation had started with her pregnancy, and no marriage cere-
mony had ever been performed. Apparently overwhelmed by the appellate
court's full-scale embrace of the Marvin doctrine in favor of Victoria, the
Illinois Supreme Court held wisely that the situation was too complex for
judicial resolution and should be left to the legislature. Unwisely and unnec-
27. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 106.
28. Id. at 110.
29. Id. at 116.
30. Id. at 122-23 (citations omitted).
31. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Il1. 1979).
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essarily, the Court proceeded to conclude that Miss Hewitt had no rights
whatever.
Problems of proof and problems of substance raised by the cohabitation
cases are indeed serious, but they must not lead toward a solution along the
lines of Hewitt. To reach a result fairer to Ms. Hewitt, the Illinois court did
not need Marvin. The court might have drawn on old-fashioned theories of
estoppel (the dentist should not be heard to deny that he is married),32 or it
could have played a little loosely with the fact that the parties' original co-
habitation took place in Iowa which recognizes common law marriage.33
Many of our courts have routinely (and sometimes not a little retrospec-
tively) used the concept of common law marriage to do "Justice" when they
felt that strict adherence to legal norms would produce injustice.34 Indeed,
most of the cases that seem to accept the Marvin doctrine may be explained
in just those terms.35
The key to a sensible solution lies here: Where there has been a long-
standing, marriage-like, role-divided, child-bearing, and child-raising rela-
tionship, a quasi-marital, legal relationship is properly thrust upon a man
and a woman especially (but not only) in case of the death of one of
them.36 In sum, nothing much short of the Hewitt facts should have
spawned a doctrine protecting "quantum-meruit-cohabitation." The Hewitt
situation merited protection, the Marvin affair did not. Both cases were de-
cided precisely wrong!
Most of the learned discussion, the decided cases, and my conclusion just
stated emphasize the rights of the parties vis-i-vis each other. Surprisingly,
there has been little thoughtful commentary on the equally important issue
of what judicial or legislative recognition should be given to the relationship
between the unmarried couple and the "welfare state."
What "public" legal consequences should attend unmarried cohabitation?
For instance, should cohabiting partners be permitted to pay income tax at
rates favoring married partners? Should they be required to pay marital
32. But cf Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987) (rejecting plaintiff's invocation of
the doctrine of marriage by estoppel).
33. Estate of Dallman, 228 N.W.2d 187 (Iowa 1975).
34. Renshaw v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1986); but cf Lynch v. Bowen, 681 F. Supp.
506 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
35. See Harry D. Krause, Legal Position: Unmarried Couples, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 533
(Supp. 1986).
36. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (1955, Supp. 1992). "Persons cohabiting and ac-
knowledging each other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the period
of 3 years, and until the decease of one of them, shall thereafter be deemed to have been legally
married." Id. "In all civil actions, except actions for criminal conversation, evidence of ac-
knowledgment, cohabitation, and reputation is competent proof of marriage." § 457:40.
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rates if that would be to the advantage of the tax authorities? If unmarried
cohabitants are allowed to waive mutual support liability, should the welfare
authorities (taxpayers) be bound by such a contract? Should a dependency
relationship based on unmarried cohabitation trigger welfare eligibility when
the "provider" leaves? Should welfare and similar benefits be terminated
when a de facto "provider" enters the picture? Should cohabitants have
standing to sue for loss of consortium and wrongful death benefits?37
The key to the answer is, I think, that no legal obligation of support be-
tween cohabitants compensates the taxpayer for extending legal benefits of
marriage. In marriage, on the other hand, society extends legal privileges
and economic benefits in exchange for the partners' legally enforceable
promise to support each other, before they may call on the taxpayer to come
to their rescue.
The legal ramifications of unmarried cohabitation will remain at the "cut-
ting edge" of developments for some time. The old family is no more, but
the new family is not yet. The revolution is not over, but the debate has
shifted from asking whether unmarried cohabitation may produce legal and
financial consequences, to what these consequences should be. In that sense,
the cohabitation debate may subtly be turning into a modern redefinition of
"marriage." 38
I'll end this segment on a positive note: The most important consequence
of non-marital cohabitation is legally solved. Non-marital children have
about the same legal rights with respect to both parents as do the children of
married parents.39 Indeed, some unmarried fathers are gaining custodial
rights to their non-marital children.4" Legal equality, however, does not
necessarily provide de facto equality. As a generalization, the unmarried
father-and even the divorced father-very typically does not have enough
money to provide an adequate level of financial support.
III. CHILD SUPPORT AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
In fiscal year 1990, the federal Office of Child Support Enforcement col-
lected six billion dollars. OCSE also reports that the aggregate amount of
37. The City of San Francisco provides employee insurance to lovers who play the role of
stay-at-home spouse, and the City of Berkeley has adopted an ordinance assimilating marriage
and cohabitation in terms of social and welfare benefits.
38. Or not so subtly. De Facto Relationships Act, N.S.W. Inc. Acts (Austl.), No. 147
(1984) reprinted in Harry D. Krause, FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS 162
(3d ed. 1990).
39. HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 115-
162 (1981).
40. UNIF. PUTATIVE AND UNKNOWN FATHERS ACT, 9B U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1992); see
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); but see Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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child support payments due for 1989 was $16.3 billion, whereas payments
totalled only $11.2 billion.
4'
Why are these 5 billion not collected? Let's put aside the cases in which
the custodial parent supports the child adequately and, for reasons of her
own, does not wish to impose on the absent parent. This leaves two alterna-
tive explanations of inadequate support: Either the state makes an inade-
quate effort to enforce existing law, or many absent fathers do not have the
money to render adequate child support. Since the applicable law and en-
forcement efforts increasingly are up to the task, I think the answer is that a
large number of defaulting fathers do not have (and never had) the missing
money. When I go to our local court on "deadbeat daddy's day" as one of
our judges calls the event, I see a parade of unemployed, and often unem-
ployable, teenagers being confronted with unmeetable financial obligations,
arising, ironically, out of constitutionally protected conduct. And that is in
a relatively affluent midwestern community, nothing like the big city.
Looking now at detailed collection statistics at the AFDC-receiving bot-
tom of the social pyramid-or has it become a diamond?-I see that we
currently spend nearly as much on collection as we collect.42 A cynic might
say that child support collection has been turned into an income transfer
program from poor fathers to lawyers and welfare bureaucrats.
Please do not misunderstand. I favor strict child support enforcement and
have worked hard to improve federal and state law toughening enforce-
ment.43 But I now find it troublesome that the absent welfare father's child
support obligation has become the only true faith. Putting it bluntly, we
have shifted our disapproving eye from what was considered the immorality
of the mother to the immorality of the father. Like the cyclops of old, we
seem to have only one eye. To the extent we are now driven to see child
support enforcement as the sole solution to child poverty, we are as wrong as
we were in the 1960's when we saw the AFDC program as the only appro-
priate source of support for female-headed families. Worse, our preoccupa-
tion with the irresponsibility of many absent fathers has displaced awareness
of the reality of the limited resources of many absent fathers. It has made a
responsible dialogue over public responsibility much more difficult.
Our extreme focus on the absent father has dissipated any sense of ur-
gency for public help for children. After voting for tougher child support
41. OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERV., CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 5 (1990).
42. Id. at 12.
43. E.g. HARRY D. KRAUSE, supra note 39.
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enforcement, the state and federal legislator is proud that something has
been done for children-and at no public cost.
My point is that we are not dealing only with the failure of private respon-
sibility. ' Whatever our views on the father's and mother's morality or irre-
sponsibility, we cannot fairly transfer our disapproval or laissez faire
tolerance to the child and limit social intervention to the prevention of out-
right starvation, at a level well below our own official definition of the pov-
erty standard. When there is no other source, the adequate support of
children is a public necessity. Quite aside from the issue of fairness, we shall
have to live with these children! Indeed, we shall have to live "off" them:
They will have to support us in retirement!
Future reform in child support requires (1) recognition of the economic
reality that many defaulting fathers simply do not have what it takes to sup-
port their children, (2) careful consideration of the heretical notion that it
may not be fair to ask all absent parents to foot the entire bill,45 and (3) a
clear understanding that children have a direct claim on society at large,
along with their parallel claim on their parents.46
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Each in its own way, these three stories contribute to my impression that
the law has not been a good midwife to the painful birth of our new family.
More radical approaches-of which only outlines can be seen-need to do
justice to the new facts of procreative life.
To deplore the demise, and wish for the return, of the gender-role stereo-
typed traditional family-as many do who urge a return to "family val-
ues"-is a pointless exercise. The role-divided family existed in, and was
44. Although Sometimes We Certainly Are: GOP Donor Accused of Failing to Provide,
CHAMPAIGN-URBANA NEWS GAZETTE, Oct. 12, 1992, at B0.
45. Is there a contradiction between lifting all "prior restraint"-social and criminal sanc-
tions-on consensual nonmarital sexual activity and then insisting on strict enforcement of a
civil liability that often amounts to eighteen years of potentially extreme restriction on the
accidental (or in any event, absent) parent's lifestyle? Is there a contradiction on divorce, when
we terminate the noncustodial parent's parental interest defacto and impose on him a greater
and less flexible support obligation than the burden he shouldered in the ongoing family? Will
rigid enforcement of high levels of child support, along with the risk of easy divorce and conse-
quent defacto termination of the father-child relationship, prove to be a disincentive to respon-
sible men to father children? Is the mere existence of a biological link enough? Or has the
rationale for the absent parent's support obligation weakened? Is the father's demotion from
cherished patriarch to absent parent entirely irrelevant to his obligations? Should a noncus-
todial ("second class") parent pay "first class" support? What level of support obligation is
consistent with modem family ties?
46. These matters are discussed in detail in Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed:
Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 367 (1990).
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suited to, its time. That was the time before effective means of birth control,
before women's economic equality, before unaffordable college costs and
before divorce at the drop of a dinner plate. That old family is not coming
back. Perhaps it wasn't even so much fun while it lasted. Neither in terms
of prescribing rigid family roles for men and women, nor in terms of the
confining content of each of these roles. Nor, importantly, for children."
Barbara Woodhouse reports:
[In Lincoln, Nebraska], each year, some 400 fathers hired our their
entire families to work the beet fields, leaving the city for the beet
field shacks in early spring before school closed and remaining un-
til late fall after the start of the new school year. Said one farmer,
"kinder eat-must work." For these families, the "family system"
of contract labor operated to preserve German culture and patriar-
chal family structures at the expense of common schooling and
English language fluency. One father explained, "In the city, I'd
have to get me a job and work the year round. This way, in the
country all the kids and the woman works.... 48
Ja, the good old days!
Professor Woodhouse continues:
Children's labor in early twentieth-century America was still, quite
literally, parental property. Under the "family labor system," the
employer would contract with the head of a family to pay to him a
given sum in exchange for the labor of all or some family members.
Children who received pay envelopes were expected to turn them
over to the parent unopened.49
Be that as it may have been, it is clear that the old family model is not
suited to the present-which is the reason it is dying. Evolution dissolves,
evolves and, with our help, resolves.
Reproduction and child-rearing were the defining social functions of the
traditional family. Reproduction and, more importantly, child-rearing re-
main among the most important social imperatives.
If the old structure no longer serves, what is to be the new? What is the
most intelligent legal response to our looser, freer lifestyles? Whatever else
we decide regarding the conduct of consenting adults, we need to be re-
minded that children are not adults and they are not consenting. Giving
47. David Shribman, How Tots Helped with the West, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1992, at A12.
48. Barbara B. Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM & MARY L. REV. 995, 1063-64 (1992) (footnotes ommitted) (emphasis
added).
49. Id. at 1064.
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them the right to "sue" their parents for "divorce" 5 ° is nonsense, but I am
sure that there must be a basic redefinition of society's involvement with the
parent-and-child relationship. The tinker-type reforms of the last thirty
years will not to do.
In one of his last opinions, Justice Brennan wrote:
In the Republic and in The Laws, Plato offered a vision of unified
society, where the needs of children are met not by parents but by
the Government, and where no intermediate forms of association
stand between the individual and the State. The vision is a brilliant
one, but it is not our own.
5
1
Indeed it is not. We seem to be moving not toward a "unified society," but
toward a fractured society in which the needs of children are "met not by
parents" and not "by the government."
What to do? First, the disincentives to having children for those who
could afford them have been' entirely too effective. Reproduction and child
rearing rates of those who could afford children, were they inclined to have
them, may already have dropped to levels endangering our economy and the
social security system. I think I have made the point that, for thinking wo-
men, the instability of modern marriage has raised to nearly unacceptable
levels the economic risk of choosing the home and children over a career.
And for thinking men, the certainty of rigorous child support enforcement
combined with the risk that a financially disabling "no-fault" divorce may be
imposed on them, has raised the cost of marriage. In any event, it should
make them think twice before "assisting" in the "production" of children.
Even happy couples limit reproduction under the pressure resulting from
both parties' pursuit of individual careers and the crushing expense of rear-
ing the modern child. Given effective birth control, ready access to abortion,
the mutual risk of easy divorce, and the sheer fun of having personal free-
dom and lots of money-at least after the student loans are paid-increasing
numbers of couples choose to remain childless altogether. In short, the op-
portunity cost of responsible child rearing has become all but prohibitive. It
seems fair to say that the current incentive structure for child bearing and
child raising delegates, de facto, the bulk of the child-raising chore to those
least able, to the economic strata without adequate income (especially un-
married, divorced, and unemployed women).
I think that those couples with double incomes and no kids (DINKS) do
not yet understand that their own future and their own retirement are di-
50. Walter Goodman, Boy Sues for the Right to Pick His Own Parents, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
18, 1992, at C34; Gregory Needed the Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at A22.
51. Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 632 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation ommit-
ted) (emphasis added).
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rectly in jeopardy. Only a healthy, educated, and willing working generation
will provide a liveable society as well as generate the necessary income to
provide retirement for their predecessors in the work place.52 In short, hav-
ing children is not just a private matter-and neither is not having children!
Lester Thurow
guarantees that most of today's Third World countries will be poor
one hundred years from now. It is simply impossible for any coun-
try to become rich in the context of a rapidly rising population.
The reasons are simple. To make new human beings into modem
productive workers takes a lot of investment.... A few American
numbers illustrate the problem. If a new American is to have the
average amount of space, a $20,000 investment has to be made in
his or her housing. Until that new American is old enough to be-
gin work, he or she will require feeding - another $20,000. To get
to the average American educational level, he or she will require
$100,000 in public and private expenditures. For that individual to
attain the average American productivity at work, another $80.000
investment will have to be made in plant and equipment. Yet an-
other $20,000 will be necessary to build the public infrastructure
(roads, sewers, water mains, airports) needed to support that indi-
vidual. Basically, each new American will require an investment
of $240,000 before he or she is capable of fitting into the American
economy as a self-sufficient, average citizen-worker-consumer.
53
Without these investments, will we become a "third world" country?54
Recent statistics on the decline of American family income may forecast an
unpleasant answer.55
Whatever we do, we must stay in line with our surviving cultural values.
These prominently include the parents' right to autonomy and privacy. But
as its corollary, parental responsibility, has slipped, we must not carry our
respect for parental rights to the point of harming the child-as I think we
have of late. Recent trends of non-intervention, of "privacy" and "value
neutrality" favor parental autonomy in procreation and child-rearing too de-
cisively. 56 There has been far too little regard for the social and educational
needs of the twenty percent of all children who even now live under the
52. Erik Eckholm, Payments to the Retired Loom Ever Larger, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30,
1992, at El, E4.
53. LESTER THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD 205-06 (1992).
54. Economic and Financial Indicators, ECONOMIST, June 27, 1992, at 119.
55. Robert Rector, America's Poverty Myth, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 1992, at A10; Robert
Rector, Government Couldn't Buy a Victory in the War on Poverty, CHAMPAIGN-URBANA
NEWS GAZETTE, Sept. 6, 1992, at BI.
56. Santoskey v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter v. Dep't. Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18
(1981).
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poverty line." Again, I hasten to emphasize that the private sphere must
indeed remain free of state intrusion, but the "private sphere" has been
wrongly defined to include areas that are of major public, of societal conse-
quence, and thus of legitimate public concern.
These are not convenient or easy questions. Beyond looking for simple
social efficiency-how to raise law abiding, work willing and work able citi-
zens-we have to weigh our broader values. And we cannot, nor do we
want to, get away from the family. The family has been the essential trans-
feror of cultural identity--ethnic, national, religious. Whether that be
Black, Hispanic, German, Polish or Italian, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, or
whatever. Our traditional commitment to cultural plurality truly is for bet-
ter or for worse, because there can be little doubt that Rawls is right, the
family does stand as an obstacle to equality. What then is more important?
I have an intriguing answer: The Gallup International Research Institute
reports that only 20% of Americans believe that equality is more important
than freedom and 72% believe that freedom is more important than equal-
ity--compared with, for instance, Italy which is evenly divided on the
issue. 
8
So we are willing to pay a price to preserve the multifaceted culture which
is our freedom. The essential question for child and family policy is, how
high that price may be. And how we might reduce that price through just
that degree of intervention that preserves, not destroys, the very values we
are after.
I'll look at one more current issue: Family Leave. In September, Presi-
dent Bush vetoed a proposal that would have given unpaid family-related
leave to employees of enterprises employing more than 50.59 The President
did not say that the bill was anti-family. He might have argued that such a
law would encourage parents to leave their family homes for outside employ-
ment, and that would be bad for "family values." But he did not say that.
Instead, he said that family leave would cost too much. Unpaid though that
leave would be (in distinction to paid family leave that is provided by many
of our successful international competitors), it would cost too much in terms
of economic disruption and resulting inefficiency. (Then he proposed a $500
million-a-year alternative that would pay the employer, not the employee,
57. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 456 (1992).
58. Life, Liberty and Try Pursuing a Bit of Tolerance Too, ECONOMIST, Sept. 5, 1992, at
19, 20.
59. Michael McQueen, Family-Leave Billfor Emergencies is Vetoed by Bush, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 23, 1992, at C13.
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through tax credits).'
Let us assume that the President is correct, and that there would be no
offsetting economic benefits through less distracted, happier workers. Let us
agree that to grant unpaid family leave would carry a net economic cost.
61
Must not the next question be whether the gain on the family front would be
greater than the loss in the economy? This is another question of whether
the price is right or the cost too great.
We must balance the cost in terms of the possible work-inefficiency of a
family-friendly work environment,6 2 against the cost in terms of family dis-
incentives through a family-unfriendly work environment. The outcome of
that evaluation depends on the answer we give to the old clich6: Do we
work to live, or do we live to work?
It is 1993. Unprecedented socio-economic change has provided equality
for women. Equality with what? Equality in the work place with the for-
merly exclusively male model of the full-time worker. But that male lifestyle
had been reconcilable with the family's child-rearing function only through
role division. I see an unbridgeable conflict between the two-full-time earner
family and the child rearing function that formerly was performed by the
one-earner, role-divided family. This judgment has nothing to do with fam-
ily values, it reflects the practical reality that, for an overwhelming number
of reasons-instability of marriage, easy divorce, professional fulfillment,
economic independence-it makes sense for both parents to be active in the
"paid" economy. We have changed the way we live, but we have not
changed the way we work.
Let's adapt the work place to the way we live and not vice versa. Unpaid
family leave would be a very modest beginning. Part-time work, flex-time
jobs, "telecommuting,"6 3 day care" and year-around schools65 are other
pieces of the answer. Again, what about the cost? Let me remind you that
we have been willing to swallow considerable economic inefficiencies by ad-
60. James Gerstenzang, Bush Proposes Alternative to Family Leave Measure, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 1992, at At.
61. Richard A. Epstein, As Unions Decline, Labor Laws Constrain the Job Market, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 2, 1992, at All.
62. Sue Shellenbarger & Cathy Trost, Annual List of Family-Friendly Firms is Issued by
Working Mother Magazine, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 1992, at A2; Working Mother Names Top
100 Companies for Working Parents, 5 NAT'L REPORT ON WORK & FAMILY 20, at 1 (1992).
63. 16,000 Bell Atlanta Members Eligible for Telecommuting, 5 NAT'L. REP. WORK &
FAM. 21, at 1 (1992).
64. Commuter Child Care Center Set to Open Near Chicago, 5 NAT'L. REP. WORK &
FAM. 21, at 1 (1992).
65. There is a serious problem with lack of air conditioning.
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justing the work place to the needs of the handicapped.66 We have accepted
great economic cost to protect the work place.67 We go all out for the envi-
ronment.6 s Where do we place the family on the scale of social values that
transcend work-efficiency?
It will have to be the task of the 1990's to develop new incentive structures
that will encourage responsible people to fulfill the social role-bearing and
socializing children-that traditionally was performed by the rigidly regu-
lated-religiously, socially and legally-family. We might have opted-and
might still opt-for another version of gender equality: Male equality in the
tasks of child-rearing and the family home. Before that would be palatable,
however, we would have to understand that, while children sometimes pro-
vide pleasure to their parents, the ever increasing cost of the modem child
must at least in part be borne by the childless segment of the economy. A
revitalized, new contract between the generations must address the "free
rider" problems and include an equalization of burdens between parents and
non-parents, whether by way of tax incentives or subsidy. Did I say "new"
contract? Plato suggested in 347 B.C. that "he... that.., does not marry
when thirty-five years old shall pay a yearly fine ... lest he imagine that
single life brings him gain and ease."6 9
More immediately, the social contract must return to one basic value
judgment: Each child must be guaranteed a decent opportunity in home and
school, in life and the economy. That is the individual human dimension.
The broader social dimension is that children are economic "infrastructure."
The cost of re-inventing our child-rearing incentive structure must be seen
for what it is: a social investment, not a consumer expense.
66. Jerome A. Hoffman & Laura Aldir-Hernandez, ADA May Let Workers Do Some Jobs
at Home, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 26, 1992, at 34.
67. The Papers that Ate America, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1992, at 24.
68. Id.
69. 1 PLATO, LAWS 313 (R. Bury trans., 1926).
